We examine whether bilateral political relations can explain investment and trade flows between the United States and other countries. We treat political relations as endogenous using instrumental variable analysis and investigate whether an exogenous shock to political relations, the 2003 war in Iraq, leads to a shift in economic flows. The results suggest that a deterioration in bilateral relations is followed by a significant decrease in economic flows between the United States and that country. These results are robust to country fixed effects, income, industry growth, financial market development, and risk.
Introduction
Political relations between countries have long been viewed as an important determinant of global economic flows (Mill, 1848; Keynes, 1919) . While the modern economics literature has focused on the influence of domestic special interest groups on trade and investment policy (Grossman and Helpman, 1994) , the political science literature typically does not address the endogeneity between international political relations and economic flows (Polachek, 1980 (Polachek, , 1997 Morrow, Siverson, and Taberes, 1998) . In this study we return to the classical question of whether political relations affect global economic flows. Specifically, we investigate whether a shift in the United States' relations with other countries affects bilateral investment and trade flows between the United States and these countries.
Political relations between countries are likely to be endogenous to economic flows. Hence, the U.S. government may maintain better relations with countries that American firms and investors have business dealings with, and vice versa. For example, the recent thaw in relations between the Indian and U.S. governments due to the United States' interest in the region following the events of September 11, 2001 , may have been prompted in part by an increase in trade and investment between the two countries. 1 To address this issue, we adopt the following empirical strategy: First, we control for country fixed-effects, which will address the type of endogeneity that arises if both political relations and economic flows are driven by unobservable time-invariant country-specific factors. Second, we treat political relations as endogenous in an instrumental variable analysis, and third, we use exogenous shock to political relations -the 2003 war in Iraq -to identify a shift in political relations between the United States and other countries.
Bilateral political relations may affect economic flows through a number of different channels.
International trade and investment flows are likely to be affected by asymmetric information between domestic and foreign firms and investors (Brennan and Cao, 1997; Rauch, 2001; Portes and Rey, 2005) . Political relations between countries can influence these information costs by facil-1 Prior to a 2006 visit to India, President George W. Bush is quoted as follows: "India's middle class is now estimated at 300 million people. Think about that." The article goes on to say, "The Bush administration is acutely aware of India changing...the President will fly into New Delhi along with a large contingent of business leaders to secure a new relationship with India." ("Booming India finds that America wants to be its new best friend," The Guardian, February 26, 2006.) itating or reducing interactions between economic agents. Trade and investment flows are also likely to depend on country-specific political risk, such as the protection of intellectual property rights (Lee and Mansfield, 1996) and expropriation risk (Thomas and Worrall, 1994; Stulz, 2005) .
Political relations can affect political risk, e.g. the closure of U.S. firms in Venezuela following a deterioration of relations between the Venezuelan and U.S. governments (U.S. Department of State, 2005) . Barriers to capital flows and trade may also depend on the political relations between countries. Recent examples include the U.S. government's decision to exclude some countries from the rebuilding process in Iraq, 2 and the backlash against American products in some parts of the world. 3 We have collected data on bilateral investment and trade flows, and on political relations between the United States and a wide range of developed and developing countries. The political relations measures distinguish between government relations and public opinion as the two may differ. For example, the Spanish government contributed troops to the Iraq war in 2003 despite strong public opposition in Spain to the war. We measure bilateral government relations using voting records from the United Nations on issues identified as important to U.S. interests. Crosscountry opinion polls about foreign citizens' perceptions of the United States and U.S. citizens' perceptions of foreign countries provide measures of public opinion.
Our results suggest that both foreign and U.S. investors take into account a change in bilateral political relations in their investment strategies. In particular, bilateral portfolio and direct investment flows between the United States and other countries decline significantly if relations between the United States and other country governments deteriorate. For example, an increase of one percentage point in the fraction of votes cast by a country in opposition to the U.S. position 2 News reports have circulated about the effects of a U.S. backlash on the market returns of firms. "...The latest was a radio report in Paris on Monday that a French catering company, Sodexho Alliance, had lost a $1 billion contract to supply food to the U.S. Marine Corps....Sodexho's shares plunged 14 percent..." ("French and German business wary of backlash", The International Herald Tribune, March 19, 2003 in the United Nations is followed by an average decrease of $92 million in quarterly investment in U.S. corporate securities from that country. Bilateral portfolio flows also respond to changes in public opinion -a decline in foreign public approval of the United States is followed by a significant decrease in portfolio flows from that country to the United States, and a decrease in U.S. portfolio flows to that country.
Trade flows also respond significantly to a shift in political relations. We find that exports of U.S. products are significantly lower to countries that experience deteriorating relations with the U.S. government, and whose public view the United States less favorably. For example, an increase in one percentage point in the fraction of votes cast by a country in opposition to the U.S. position in the United Nations is followed by an average decrease of $337 million in quarterly imports to the United States from that country. Foreign imports into the United States also decrease significantly following a deterioration in bilateral government relations. Note that these results correct for endogeneity in political relations and are robust to country fixed-effects and time-varying country characteristics.
It is important to investigate the determinants of cross-country trade and investment flows because the globalization of economic flows has been shown to have a positive impact on poverty reduction and economic growth (Dollar and Kraay, 2004) . The literature has focused on "frictions" including regulatory barriers (Levine, 2005; Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad, 2005) , static institutional factors such as shareholder and creditor rights (La Porta et al., 1998) , dynamic political factors (Rajan and Zingales, 2003) , political risk (Lee and Mansfield, 1996) , and asymmetric information between foreign and domestic investors (Brennan and Cao, 1997; Froot, O'Connell, and Seasholes, 2001; Rauch, 2001; Portes and Rey, 2005) , to explain patterns of international economic flows. Several recent studies also suggest that social institutions such as trust and culture may affect cross-border flows (Stulz and Williamson, 2003; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2009; Siegel, Licht and Schwartz, 2008) . Relatedly, Morse and Shive (2008) argue that one explanation for the "home bias" puzzle is that countries whose citizens are more "patriotic" hold smaller foreign equity positions.
Unlike static factors such as a common language or religion, political relations between countries can change over time. Therefore, bilateral political relations can be used to explain changes in economic flows between countries. Our results suggest that such a change in political relations can have a significant impact on bilateral trade and investment flows.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we discuss the relationship between political relations and economic flows. Section 3 discusses the data. Section 4 describes the estimation strategy. Section 5 presents the results, and Section 6 concludes.
The Influence of Political Relations on Economic Flows
In this section we discuss the different channels by which political relations between countries may affect economic flows.
Bilateral political relations can affect interactions between economic agents and thereby information costs for foreign firms and investors. Recent studies have shown that economic flows are likely to be affected by asymmetric information between domestic and foreign firms and investors (Brennan and Cao, 1997; Froot, O'Connell, and Seasholes, 2001; Portes, Rey, and Oh, 2001; Rauch, 2001; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2009; Brennan et al., 2005; Portes and Rey, 2005; Siegel, Licht, and Schwartz, 2008) . For example, Brennan and Cao (1997) , Froot, O'Connell, and Seasholes (2001) , and Brennan et al. (2005) interpret the positive correlation between international equity flows and stock market returns in the destination country as evidence of information asymmetry between foreign and domestic investors. Portes, Rey, and Oh (2001) and Portes and Rey (2005) find that international equity flows are inversely related to the distance between countries, which they interpret as evidence that countries that are geographically closer tend to know more about each other. 4 Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009) show that bilateral trade and investment flows are higher between countries whose citizens "trust" each other more, where trust may capture information costs, and, Siegel, Licht, and Schwartz (2008) argue that by increasing information asymmetry and transaction costs, the cultural distance between markets can affect international debt flows, cross-border equity issuance, and mergers and acquisitions. Lastly, Rauch (2001) argues that business and social networks between countries can help overcome barriers to international trade in goods, such as those arising out of a lack of information about trading opportunities.
Political relations between countries can affect the risks faced by foreign investors, e.g. the 4 The large literature on the "home bias" puzzle also documents the role of geographic proximity on investor holdings and firms' financing decisions (Tesar and Werner, 1995; Kang and Stulz, 1997; Muskowitz, 1999, 2001; Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; Sarkissian and Schill, 2004) .
seizure by the U.S. government of $1.4 billion of Iraq's financial assets that were held in U.S.
banks. 5 Country-specific risks have been shown to impact economic flows (Lee and Mansfield, 1996; Maskus, 2000; Stulz, 2005) . In particular, Lee and Mansfield's (1996) results suggest that protection of intellectual property rights significantly affects the volume and composition of U.S.
foreign direct investment.
Capital and trade barriers also affect economic flows (Levine, 2005; Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad, 2005 
Measuring Political Relations and Economic Flows
The following subsections describe the different measures of bilateral economic flows and political relations between the United States and other countries used in this paper. Appendix 1 summarizes the data sources and the definitions of the variables used in the analysis.
Government Relations
We construct three measures of bilateral political relations. The first is a measure of similarity in foreign policy positions based on voting data from the United Nations General Assembly on issues "which directly affected the United States' interests and on which the United States lobbied extensively" (U.S. Department of State, 2000 State, -2004 . We define UN Opposite Vote as the number of votes cast by a country at the United Nations that are not identical to the U.S. vote (includes votes that are opposite to the U.S. vote, abstentions, and absences) scaled by the total number of votes, which is the sum of identical votes, opposite votes, abstentions and absences for each country. . 9 To avoid attrition bias we do not require a balanced sample.
In Table 1 we report summary statistics describing the political relation variables. To capture differences based on a shift in political relations due to the war, we divide the sample into countries that were part of the 2003 Iraq war coalition, and non-coalition countries. 10 The list of coalition countries are provided in Appendix 2. The summary statistics suggest that both before and after the war, coalition countries oppose the United States less frequently in the United Nations compared to non-coalition countries (59% vs. 77% before and 60% vs. 75% after the war, respectively).
Public Opinion
Data on public opinion polls were obtained from the Gallup Organization and the Pew Research
Center for the People and the Press. These data cover a smaller subset of countries than the data on bilateral government relations.
We construct or "somewhat favorable" view of the United States.
From Table 1 we note that after the war, there is a significant decline of 27 percentage points in the fraction of foreign citizens holding a favorable opinion of the United States. While before the war, citizens of coalition countries viewed the United States more favorably compared to noncoalition countries (71% and 61%, respectively), after the war there is a sharp decline in the fraction of the public in coalition countries with a favorable opinion of the United States, from 71% to 45%. hold a "very favorable" or "mostly favorable" view of the foreign country in question.
Data on public perceptions in the United
We note from Table 1 that countries that joined the Iraq war coalition are viewed significantly more favorably by U.S. citizens both before (66%) and after the war (64%), relative to non-coalition countries (46% and 44% before and after the war, respectively). However, we note that in contrast to foreign public opinion of the United States, U.S. perceptions of other countries remain relatively stable before and after the war.
The number of observations reported for the political variables in Table 1 is different from the regression analyses below because in the regressions we also require data on economic flows and control variables for each country. In the regression analysis, foreign portfolio investment in U.S. corporate securities is constructed as the sum of (3) and (4) for each country divided by aggregate quarterly portfolio inflows into all U.S. securities from all countries. By using ratios we control for the possibility that some countries invest more in U.S. securities than others.
Economic Flows
We observe quarterly values of purchases of foreign stocks and bonds by U. These data do not distinguish between investment in government and corporate securities. From Table 2 we note that U.S. portfolio investment in coalition countries is more than four times as high as U.S. investment in non-coalition countries.
Foreign direct investment:
We obtain quarterly data on foreign direct investment ( Table 2 show that after the war, quarterly foreign FDI inflows into the United States fell by more than half, from $1.2 billion to $576 million. This decrease was driven by countries that did not join the Iraq war coalition -FDI from non-coalition countries into the United States dropped nearly 67% after the start of the Iraq war. Interestingly, before the war, FDI flows into the United States did not differ significantly between coalition and non-coalition countries.
Trade flows: We obtain quarterly exports and imports data from the International Trade
Center, UNCTAD, in millions of U.S. dollars. The data is observed for 51 countries in each of the years 2000-2004. We use the log of exports and imports in the regression analysis. The summary statistics in Table 2 suggest that non-coalition countries are larger trading partners of the United
States than coalition countries. On average, both exports of U.S. products and imports of foreign products into the United States are nearly twice as high from non-coalition countries than coalition countries.
The number of observations reported for the economic flow variables in Table 2 differs from the regression analyses because in the regressions we also require data on the political and control variables for each country.
11 The U.S. portfolio outflows data identify the country of transaction rather than the country in which the foreign security is issued. Warnock and Mason (2001) argue that since transactions that go through financial centers (Hong Kong and the United Kingdom) may involve securities issued in other countries, the treasury data may result in overestimating U.S. outflows to the financial centers. As a robustness check, we remove Hong Kong and United
Kingdom from the sample and find that the regression results reported below are not affected. These results are available on request.
Country-specific Controls
In the regression analysis we control for several country-specific factors that can influence foreign investment and trade flows. First, since investment opportunities are likely to depend on country risk, we use the log value of each country's total risk score (Country Risk ) obtained from Euromoney Magazine's country risk ranking for the sample period of 2000-2004. 12 A higher value indicates lower overall country risk. We also control for country-specific factors that are likely to influence investment and trade flows, including per capita GDP (GDP per capita), domestic growth opportunities as measured by the growth rate of industry value added (Industry Growth), financial market development measured by the ratio of domestic credit to GDP (Domestic Credit/GDP), inflation measured by the GDP deflator (Inflation), and exchange rate risk measured by the current account balance as a percentage of GDP (Current Account Balance/GDP). These data are from the World Bank's World Development Indicators database. While other factors such as country legal system and geographic distance may influence bilateral economic flows, these variables cannot be identified in our regressions because we include country fixed-effects.
Estimation Strategy
We address the potential endogeneity between bilateral political relations and economic flows in the following ways: First, we control for country fixed-effects in the estimations, which will address the type of endogeneity that may arise if both political relations and economic flows are driven by unobservable time-invariant country-specific factors. Second, to address selection based on timevarying unobservable factors we treat the political relations variables as endogenous using T ourism, the annual number of tourists traveling from each country to the United States, and Immigration, the annual number of immigrants from each country to the United States, as instrumental variables. 
where the economic flows and political relations variables are described in Section 3. W ar t is a dummy variable that is equal to one starting in the first quarter of 2003, X c,t represents a vector of time-varying country-specific controls, which includes size (GDP per capita), financial market development (Domestic Credit/GDP), domestic growth opportunities (Industry Growth), inflation, exchange rate risk (Current Account Balance/GDP), and country risk. α c is a country-specific fixed effect and ε c,t reflects unobserved shocks affecting bilateral economic flows between these countries and the United States. Finally, the standard errors in all the specifications are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the Huber-White procedure and are clustered at the country-level.
Next, to account for the impact of the war on how economic flows are related to bilateral political relations, we also estimate the following specification with country fixed-effects:
Economic F lows US c,t
where the coefficient of the interaction term, α 3 , measures the change in economic flows in response to a shift in political relations after the war, and the other variables are as described above.
We discuss the results from estimating specification (1) in Sections 5.1-5.4 and the results from estimating specification (2) in Section 5.5.
Results
We report the relationship between government relations and foreign portfolio investment in U.S.
corporate securities in Table 3 .
Foreign Portfolio Investment in U.S. Corporate Securities
As a benchmark we estimate a pooled OLS specification, which describes the correlation between economic flows and political relations. The OLS results suggest that foreign purchases of U.S.
corporate securities and UN Opposite Vote are negatively correlated (Column (1)). Correcting for country fixed-effects and endogeneity of political relations, the negative and statistically significant coefficient of UN Opposite Vote suggests that if a country opposes the United States more frequently in the United Nations, this leads to a significant decrease in investment from that country in U.S.
corporate securities (Column (2)). The negative coefficient of War suggests that on average foreign portfolio investment in U.S. corporate securities declines significantly after the war.
Considering the influence of foreign public approval of the United States (Poll ) on foreign purchases of U.S. corporate securities, we note that a decrease in foreign public approval of the United States is followed by a decrease in investment from that country in U.S. corporate securities (Columns (4) and (5)). This result is robust to treating Poll as endogenous and controlling for country fixed-effects (Column (5)). The OLS results suggest that foreign investment in U.S. corporate securities is also positively correlated with U.S. public approval of foreign countries (Perception), but this result is not robust to treating Perception as endogenous.
The impact of bilateral political relations on foreign portfolio investment flows to the United
States is also economically significant. For example, an increase of one percentage point in the fraction of votes cast in opposition to the United States is followed by a decrease of about $92.2 million in quarterly investment in U.S. corporate securities from that country, holding aggregate inflows into all U.S. securities from all countries constant (Column (2)). 13 These results are consistent with the hypothesis that deteriorating political relations may increase political risks, information and transaction costs, and barriers to investment, thereby reducing investment flows. Next we consider the relationship between political relations and U.S.
portfolio investment in foreign securities. 13 We multiply the coefficient of UN Opposite Vote in Column (2), equal to −0.0060, with average foreign portfolio investment in U.S. corporate securities, equal to $15.37 billion.
U.S. Portfolio Investment in Foreign Securities
The results are reported in Table 4 . We find that U.S. investors invest less in countries that oppose the U.S. position more frequently in the United Nations, and this result is robust to country fixedeffects and treating political relations as endogenous (Column (2)). For example, a one percentage point increase in UN Opposite Vote is followed by a decline of $94.9 million in quarterly U.S.
portfolio flows to that country on average, holding total U.S. portfolio investment in all countries constant (Column (2)). 14 U.S. portfolio flows to foreign countries decline significantly following the war (Column (2)).
The results suggest that U.S. portfolio investment flows respond significantly to changes in foreign public opinion. A decline in foreign public approval of the United States leads to a significant decrease in U.S. portfolio investment flows to that country (Columns (4) and (5)).
The relationship between U.S. portfolio investment in foreign securities and political relations is consistent with the hypothesis that economic flows may decline due to an increase in risk and transaction costs, or negative investor perceptions about growth opportunities, in the country experiencing deteriorating relations with the United States. Next, we investigate whether political relations influence foreign direct investment flows. Table 5 reports the results with foreign direct investment flows into the United States as the dependent variable. We find that foreign direct investment flows to the United States are negatively related to UN Opposite Vote (Columns (1) and (2)), suggesting that foreign firms based in countries that are unfriendly to the United States may face a higher cost of doing business in the United
Foreign Direct Investment Flows
States. In the case of public opinion, the OLS results suggest that foreign direct investment inflows to the United States are positively correlated with foreign public approval of the United States (Poll ) and U.S. public approval of foreign countries (Perception). However, these results are not robust in the instrumental variable specification.
Considering foreign direct investment outflows from the United States to other countries as the dependent variable, we note from the results reported in Table 6 that while FDI flows are negatively correlated with UN Opposite Vote, the relationship is not robust to controlling for endogeneity in the instrumental variable specification. Similarly, FDI outflows do not appear to be significantly related to public opinion in the United States and other countries.
The results suggest that FDI inflows to the United States decline if bilateral government relations deteriorate, while FDI outflows do not appear to be robustly related to either government or public relations. Unlike portfolio investment, the decision to undertake foreign direct investment is less likely to respond promptly to changes in political relations. Next we investigate whether international trade flows depend on bilateral political relations.
Trade Flows
We discuss the results with U.S. exports to foreign countries as the dependent variable in Table 7 .
The negative and significant coefficient of UN Opposite Vote in the instrumental variable regression suggests that foreign exports of U.S. goods and services decline significantly following a deterioration in bilateral government relations (Column (2)). From the coefficient of War we note that U.S.
exports to foreign countries decrease significantly following the war.
U.S. exports to foreign countries are significantly related to public opinion of the United States in those countries. Correcting for country fixed-effects and endogeneity of Poll, we note that a decline in foreign public approval of the United States is followed by a significant decline in U.S.
exports to that country (Column (5)). The results suggest that U.S. public opinion about other countries is positively related to purchases of U.S. products in those countries (Columns (7) and (8)).
Examining the influence of political relations on the imports of foreign products by the United
States in Table 8 , we find that correcting for fixed-effects and endogeneity of political relations, foreign imports from a country to the United States decline significantly if that country opposes the U.S. position more frequently in the United Nations (Column (2)). Specifically, an increase in one percentage point in UN Opposite Vote is followed by a decrease of $336.8 million on average in quarterly imports from that country to the United States. 15 U.S. imports of foreign products do not appear to be robustly related to public opinion. 15 We multiply the coefficient of UN Opposite Vote in Column (2) equal to −0.8214, with the average (log) value of imports equal to 7.085.
Our findings suggest that a deterioration in political relations between countries may lead to a decrease in bilateral trade flows. These results are robust to controlling for country fixed-effects, endogeneity of political relations, and country-specific controls.
Political Relations and the War
Next, we investigate whether a change in bilateral political relations due to an exogenous shockthe 2003 war in Iraq -leads to a shift in economic flows. Specifically, we estimate specification (2) described in Section 4 and report the results in Tables 3-8.
In the case of bilateral portfolio investment flows, we note from the coefficient of War × UN Opposite Vote that economic flows change significantly in response to an exogenous shift in political relations due to the war (Column (3), Tables 3 and 4) . Although the overall effect of UN Opposite
Vote on portfolio investment remains negative, the relationship is less negative after the war. This is consistent with the hedging hypothesis that foreign investors based in countries that experience deteriorating relations with the United States may invest more in the United States in order to hedge their country's higher political risk, and U.S. investors may invest more in foreign securities if deteriorating relations reduces opportunities for U.S. firms in that country.
From the coefficient of the interaction term we note that after the war an increase in UN Opposite
Vote is followed by a decline in U.S. foreign direct investment flows to that country and a decrease in imports from that country to the United States (Column (3), Tables 6 and 8) . Moreover, a decline in foreign public approval of the United States after the war leads to a significant decline in U.S. exports to that country (Column (6), Table 7 ). It also appears that after the war U.S.
exports to a country increase following a decline in U.S. public approval of that country (Column (9), Table 7 ), although this result may not be robust due to the small sample size.
Controlling for country fixed-effects and country-specific characteristics, our results suggest that bilateral economic flows change significantly in response to a shift in political relations between the United States and other countries following the 2003 war in Iraq. This allows us to capture a causal impact of bilateral political relations on economic flows.
Conclusion
In this paper we investigate the relationship between bilateral political relations and economic flows between the United States and a wide range of developed and developing countries. Since political relations and economic flows are likely to be endogenously determined, we treat political relations as endogenous using instrumental variable analysis. In addition, we use an exogenous shock, the 2003 Iraq war, to identify a shift in political relations that is not related to economic flows.
There is a large literature on the role of a country's institutional characteristics, and the geographic and cultural proximity between countries, in determining cross-border economic flows.
Unlike these static factors, political relations between countries are likely to vary over time and therefore can be used to explain changes in bilateral economic flows. Political relations between countries may affect economic flows through a number of different channels. In particular, deteriorating political relations between countries may increase risks to foreign investors and trade arising out of asymmetric information, expropriation risk, and changes in government policy. Political relations may also affect international trade through its effect on trade barriers and the consumption decisions of the public.
Our results suggest that capital flows between the United States and the world respond significantly to a shift in political relations. For example, bilateral portfolio and direct investment flows between the United States and other countries decrease significantly if relations between the foreign and U.S. government deteriorate. We find that investment flows also respond significantly to a shift in public opinion: A decline in foreign public approval of the United States is followed by a significant decrease in bilateral portfolio flows between that country and the United States.
The results suggest that trade flows also respond to a shift in political relations. For example, exports of U.S. products are significantly lower to countries that experience deteriorating relations with the U.S. government and whose public view the United States less favorably. Imports from foreign countries into the United States also decrease significantly following a deterioration in relations between the United States and the foreign country government. Therefore, these results suggest that political relations between countries are likely to be a key determinant of economic exchange. Foreign inflows into U.S. corporate securities, is the sum of (3) and (4) for each country, divided by aggregate portfolio inflows into all U.S. securities from all countries.
Appendix 1. Data Sources and Descriptions

2000-2004
U.S. capital flows into foreign securities
Source: U.S. Department of Treasury. Capital outflow is quarterly purchase of foreign securities by U.S. residents from foreigners, in millions of dollars. Foreign securities include: (5) foreign bonds and (6) foreign stocks.
Purchase of foreign securities by U.S. residents is the sum of (5) and (6) 
2000-2004
U.S. exports; U.S. imports Source: International Trade Centre (UNCTAD/WTO).
Quarterly data aggregated from monthly U.S. imports and exports, in thousands of dollars. (Pew Research Center, 2002 . Based on survey question -"Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of the United States".
The percentage of foreign citizens surveyed who hold a "very favorable" view or a "somewhat favorable" view of the U.S.
2000, 2002-2004
Instrumental variables Tourism Source: log of the annual number of nonimmigrants admitted to the U.S.
2000-2004
Immigration Source: 
